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1 Introduction
Several banks and other nancial institutions experienced sudden and mas-
sive withdrawals of deposits and other funding sources during the recent -
nancial crisis. Examples include the retail bank Northern Rock in the UK, the
investment bank Bear Stearns in the US and the DSB Bank in the Nether-
lands. It is often claimed that not only the deterioration of fundamental
variables led to the run of withdrawals, but that there was also a substan-
tial self-fullling component to the behavior of depositors. Depositors may
rush to the bank to withdraw fearing that other depositorswithdrawals will
cause the bank to fail. This idea is borne out by the words of Anne Burke,
an ordinary customer of Northern Rock, who while queuing up to withdraw
money from the bank said: Its not that I disbelieve Northern Rock, but
everyone is worried and I dont want to be the last one in the queue. If
everyone else does it, it becomes the right thing to do.1 Actually, the run on
Northern Rock started after the Bank of England announced that it would
provide the necessary emergency liquidity support to prevent fundamental
problems in the bank. The above quote illustrates that depositors react to
other depositorsobserved decisions.
As further evidence consider Kelly and O Grada (2000), Starr and Yil-
maz (2007), and Iyer and Puri (2012) who empirically analyze real-world
bank runs and illustrate that depositorsactions are a¤ected by observable
decisions of their peers. Experimental evidence also suggests that observabil-
ity plays an important role in the emergence of bank runs (see, for example,
Garratt and Keister, 2009; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Kiss et al. 2012).
Motivated by the relevance of observability of depositorsdecisions, we mod-
ify the canonical Diamond-Dybvig model (1983) by assuming that depositors
perfectly observe the sequence of actions taken by those who precede them.
Therefore, we model a sequential-move game with a nite number of depos-
1See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aeypCkzcRlU4
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itors who contact the bank in an exogenously given xed order to commu-
nicate whether to leave the money deposited or to withdraw it. Moreover,
following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and recent models, such as Ennis and
Keister (2009), we assume that there is aggregate certainty about liquidity
types.2
Converting the original Diamond-Dybvig setup in which depositors decide
simultaneously into a sequential-move game yields interesting results. When
liquidity types and actions are perfectly observed, then no bank run occurs
and the Pareto e¢ cient allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome. Our
main contribution is to extend this result to the case when the sequence of
liquidity types is of imperfect information, that is, a depositors liquidity
type is her private information.
Under perfect information, our result is obtained by backward induction.
Waiting dominates withdrawal for the last patient depositor if enough depos-
itors before her waited. Anticipating this decision, the next to last patient
depositors decision is of the same nature, and by moving backwards, all
patient depositors wait.
Under imperfect information, the liquidity type vector is randomly se-
lected by nature and is unobservable to the depositors and the bank. Every
depositor, as it is her turn to decide, observes previous decisions and forms
beliefs about which type vector was selected, or in other words, whether be-
fore her withdrawals were due to impatient depositors only or patient ones
withdrew as well. Based on her observation, on her belief and on the strat-
egy prole, a depositor determines whether it is optimal for her to withdraw
or not. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, as dened by Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991), imposes a strong rationality criterion on the strategy prole and be-
lief system. This enables us to obtain a unique prediction on depositors
behavior which coincides with the solution under perfect information. On
2Banks usually know how much funds are withdrawn on average a day, and any larger
withdrawal frequently has to be announced by the depositor to the bank in order for the
bank to make the corresponding funds available.
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the equilibrium path, patient depositors wait and impatient ones withdraw.
The last decade saw an immense increase in the information ow between
people and depositors decisions are no exception. Hence, a considerable
amount of information is available through traditional (TV, radio and news-
papers) and social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) about how depositors
decide. It is of utmost importance for policymakers to know how this abun-
dance of information a¤ects depositorsbehavior. This paper attempts to be
a step in this understanding by showing that when all previous decisions are
observed, bank runs resulting from coordination problems do not occur.
Although we focus on banks, run-like phenomena occur in other institu-
tions and markets as well (such as money-market, hedge or pension funds)
and our analysis applies analogously to them.
Related literature
In the classic Diamond-Dybvig framework multiple equilibria exist, and the
Pareto e¢ cient outcome of no bank run is no unique equilibrium. This sug-
gests that banks are intrinsically fragile and susceptible to self-fullling runs.
The literature attempts to identify elements that lead to this kind of fragility
and conditions to mitigate it. There are two approaches in the literature: one
is game theoretic and the other based on mechanism design.
Given certain constraints, the mechanism design strand of the literature
studies how to optimally assign consumption to depositors depending on
their announcements.3 For example, Green and Lin (2003) add aggregate
uncertainty about liquidity needs to the Diamond-Dybvig framework and
assume that depositors know the order in which they have an opportunity
to withdraw. The bank updates its belief about the type distribution after
each decision and optimizes the contract accordingly. As a result, complex
contracts arise that are contingent on the exact sequence of announcements
3Usually a direct revelation mechanism is studied: when contacting the bank, depositors
tell the bank their type. When a depositor announces to be impatient, the bank assigns
her an optimal consumption based on the available information.
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and payments to depositors may be fairly variable. Nevertheless, the Pareto
e¢ cient allocation is shown to be the unique equilibrium outcome.
Regarding the game theoretic approach, the rst step is to nd the Pareto
e¢ cient allocation which a social planner would choose if she knew the type
vector in the economy. Then, the outcomes of a game are studied assuming
that types are imperfect information. In the Diamond-Dybvig setup with
aggregate certainty about liquidity types the rst best yields an optimal
simple demand deposit contract that determines how much money the bank
should pay to those who withdraw in the early period and together with the
number of early withdrawals consumption in the second period is determined.
If the game is specied as a simultaneous-move game, then a bank run and
a no bank run equilibrium arises. However, Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
show that even if the optimal simple demand deposit contract is maintained,
the Pareto e¢ cient allocation becomes the unique equilibrium outcome if
the simultaneous-move game is complemented by a suspension of payments
clause. It stipulates that, after a certain number of withdrawals, payment to
subsequent depositors is suspended. The mere expectation of suspension is
enough to rule out bank runs.
Our paper applies the game theoretic approach. We build on the original
Diamond-Dybvig setup and use their optimal simple demand deposit con-
tract. As Ennis and Keister (2010) point out, the contract that implements
the optimal allocation in the Green-Lin model is highly contingent on the
available information, and hence results in volatile payments to depositors of
the same liquidity type. However, in reality, we observe stable payments to
depositors and the face value of deposits is respected most of times. These
features are more akin to the simple demand deposit contract á la Diamond
and Dybvig (1983). We maintain this optimal simple demand deposit con-
tract and change the game by allowing the exact sequence of previous actions
to be observed, though not the liquidity type vector.
As already mentioned, observability is an essential element of a depositors
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decision. The empirical studies cited above suggest that, at least to some
extent, both waiting and withdrawal may be observed. At rst it appears
questionable how waiting can be observed. However, Kelly and O Grada
(2000) show that although there were other factors, the most important one
determining whether an individual panicked or not in New York during a
bank run episode in the 19th century was his county of origin in Ireland.
This common origin presumably had an e¤ect since immigrants from the
same county lived in the same neighborhood and observed each other. Iyer
and Puri (2012) stress the importance of observing decisions of both sorts in
ones social network when studying a bank run that occurred in India in 2001.
In Starr and Yilmaz (2007), small and medium-sized depositors of an Islamic
bank in Turkey seemed to observe only withdrawals of their peers during a
bank run incident in 2001, but the behavior of large depositors appears to
be driven by observing both actions.
Our paper shows that even without a suspension-of-convertibility clause,
no bank run is the unique equilibrium outcome if the history of previous
actions is observed. The paper closest to ours regarding the emphasis put
on observability is Andolfatto et al. (2007) who are the rst to assume
the observability of the history of announcements. In the spirit of Green
and Lin (2003), they use a mechanism design approach in an environment
characterized by aggregate uncertainty about liquidity needs and show that
any allocation that is implementable is also strongly implementable. The
role of observability is intricate. On the one hand, knowing the complete
history allows a depositor to condition her action on it. This strengthens
the incentive compatibility constraints, implying that fewer allocations are
implementable. On the other hand, a depositor prefers to announce her type
truthfully if she believes that those who follow her will do so as well. In
that sense, observing previous decisions does not a¤ect the optimal decision.
Contrary to Andolfatto et al. (2007), we assume that the bank pays the same
amount of money to withdrawing depositors as long as it has funds left. In
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our model, the bank may run out of funds, leaving depositors who wish to
withdraw unpaid. This cannot happen in Green and Lin (2003) or Andolfatto
et al. (2007). Depositors condition their choice on the history of previous
decisions and we consider all possible histories after which a depositor is
asked to decide. Sometimes, given certain histories and independently of
what subsequent depositors do even a patient depositor is strictly better o¤
to withdraw. We determine all histories that imply truthful reporting for
subsequent depositors and nd that as the game unfolds only these histories
arise. In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, early depositors correctly anticipate
to be on the equilibrium path, take the optimal decision and lead the game
down the path to the unique equilibrium outcome with no bank run.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and
denes the model. In section 3, we provide examples and the general results,
while section 4 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
There are three time periods denoted by t = 0; 1; 2; and a nite set of depos-
itors denoted by I = f1; :::; Ng; where N > 2: The consumption of depositor
i 2 I in period t = 1; 2 is denoted by ct;i 2 R0+; and her liquidity type by i:
This is a binomial random variable with support given by the set of liquidity
types  = f0; 1g: If i = 0; depositor i is called impatient, that is, she only
cares about consumption at t = 1: If i = 1; depositor i is called patient.
Given i 2 f0; 1g; each depositor is utility function is given by
ui(c1;i; c2;i; i) = ui(c1;i + ic2;i):
It is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously
di¤erentiable and to satisfy the Inada conditions. The relative risk-aversion
coe¢ cient,  ciu00i (ci)=u0i(ci); is assumed to be strictly larger than 1, for all
ci 2 R+; and all i 2 I:
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At t = 0; each depositor i 2 I has one unit of a homogeneous good
which she deposits in the bank. The bank has access to a constant-return-
to-scale productive technology which pays a gross return of one unit for
each endowment liquidated at t = 1; and a xed return of R > 1 for each
endowment liquidated at t = 2: It o¤ers a simple demand deposit contract
which pays c1; which is determined below, to any depositor i who withdraws
at t = 1; as long as the bank has funds left, and the same pro rata share of
funds available to all depositors who wait until t = 2:
The number of patient depositors is assumed to be constant and given
by p 2 f1; :::; Ng and the remaining depositors are impatient. The number
of patient and impatient depositors is common knowledge. However, each
depositors type is only realized at t = 1:
Let N = f0; 1gN ; and N = (1; :::; N) denote the sequence of depos-
itors, also called (liquidity) type vector. The set of sequences of length N
with p patient depositors is given by
N;p = fN 2 N :
NP
i=1
i = pg:
There are
 
N
p

possible type vectors. At t = 1; one is selected randomly by
a process which selects each of them with equal probability. Under imperfect
information, the realized liquidity type vector is unobserved both by the
depositors and the bank, while it is observable under perfect information.
Next, the Pareto e¢ cient allocation is derived. A social planner could
maximize the sum of depositorsutilities (which are assumed to be identical,
except of the liquidity type) with respect to c1;i and c2;i subject to a resource
constraint and to the commonly known number of patient and impatient
depositors, p and N   p; respectively. The rst best allocation solves
maxc1;i;c2;i(N   p)ui(c1;i) + pui(c2;i)
s. t. (N   p)c1;i + pRc2;i = N:
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The solution to this problem is
u0(c1) = Ru
0(c2);
which, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), implies that R > c2 > c

1 > 1:
In the rst best allocation, all impatient depositors consume c1 at t = 1;
and all patient ones c2 at t = 2: Hence, patient depositors receive a higher
consumption than impatient ones.
2.1 Strategies and equilibrium concept
A sequential service constraint is assumed to hold, that is, at t = 1; the
depositors contact the bank sequentially in the order given by N ; and the
payment to any withdrawing depositor only depends on the history, but not
on the decisions of subsequent depositors, as will be specied below.
Depositor is strategy si 2 f0; 1g is to announce a type from : When
type 0 or type 1 is announced, the depositor wishes to withdraw or wait,
respectively. Anonymity is assumed, that is, the depositorsindexes do not
reveal any information. Each depositor i is assumed to observe the entire
history of previous type announcements si 1 = (s1; :::; si 1); where si 1 2
i 1: Depositor is strategy is conditional on the history and her type. It
is dened as si : i 1   ! : Let S = f0; 1gN be the games strategy
space, and let s 2 S be a strategy prole, that is, s = (s1; :::; sN): In order to
emphasize depositor is strategy, s is sometimes written as (si; s i):
Given strategy prole s 2 S; depositor is consumption is specied by
ci = (c1;i; c2;i); where c1;i : i ! R0+; and c2;i : N ! R0+: The consumption
of all depositors is feasible if
PN
i=1(c1;i +
c2;i
R
)  N: Depositor is period-1
consumption is then dened as
c1;i =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
c1; if si = 0 and N  
i 1P
j=1
sjc

1  c1;
y; if si = 0 and 0 < N  
i 1P
j=1
sjc

1 < c

1;
0; otherwise,
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where y = N  Pi 1j=1 sjc1 : until the bank runs out of funds, any depositor
who announces to be impatient receives a positive consumption c1 or y:
Let  2 f0; :::; pg be the number of depositors who wait at t = 1; that is,
each of them announces to be of type 1.4 Given  =
PN
i=1 si  0; all players
who wait at t = 1; obtain the same consumption at t = 2; namely,
c2() = maxf0; R(N (N )c

1)

g:
If  = p; that is, only impatient depositors withdraw at t = 1; then c2() =
c2 > c

1; and patient depositors enjoy a higher consumption than impatient
ones.
The consumption in both periods depends on the strategy prole and
determines each depositors utility. For any i 2 I; and any s 2 S; this is
denoted by ui(s): Thus, ui is a mapping from S to R0+: Let the tuple (I;S; u)
be the bank run game, where u = (u1; :::; uN):
Any depositor i observes history si 1; knows her type i and the com-
monly known parameters p and N: However, under imperfect information,
she does not observe the realized type vector and both patient and impatient
depositors may choose to withdraw. Therefore, given the available informa-
tion, she forms beliefs about the type vector that was selected by nature. Let
i  i(N j si 1; i) denote depositor is belief about the true type vector.
This belief is conditional on the history and is type and is updated according
to Bayesrule whenever possible. The belief together with a strategy prole
denes a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Denition 1. Given a bank run game. Then, strategy prole s 2 S and
belief system  = (1; :::N) are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) if,
and only if, for all i 2 I; given i; si 1 and any ~si 2 f0; 1g;
4Note that  is restricted to be equal to p or smaller since an impatient depositor has
a dominant strategy to withdraw, and thus, not more than p depositors will wait.
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P
N2N
i(
N j si 1; i)ui(s) 
P
N2N
i(
N j si 1; i)ui(~si; s i);
where i(
N j si 1; i) is consistent with Bayesrule whenever possible.
A strategy prole and a system of beliefs are a PBE if, and only if, the
strategy is sequentially rational for all players and the belief is consistent
with the strategy (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, and Myerson, 1997).
Moreover, there are consistency requirements on the beliefs that arise from
the fact that p and N are commonly known and also since an impatient
depositors dominant strategy is to withdraw. These are discussed in more
depth in the section on imperfect information below.
3 Results
The simple demand deposit contract dened above yields the Pareto e¢ cient
allocation (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Our goal is to show that this
allocation is the unique PBE outcome of the bank run game.
Given p; N and c1 it is possible to determine how many patient depositors
have to wait in order for waiting to be an optimal strategy for each of them.
In Lemma 1, one part of this threshold is derived,5 namely, the one (denoted
as ) such that c2;i > c1; for every patient depositor i who waits at t = 1: If
some patient depositor declares to be impatient, then the bank spends funds
on her which it would otherwise have kept until t = 2: Recall that  is the
number of patient depositors that wait.
Lemma 1. Given p; N and c1; there is a unique  such that 1    p; and
for every patient depositor i for whom si = 1; c2;i() < c1; for all   ; and
c2;i() > c

1; for all  > :
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix A.
5The other part is a technical detail which is derived below in Proposition 1s proof.
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3.1 The type vector is perfect information
The benchmark case with perfect information is studied next. The depositors
commonly know the number of patient depositors p; and each depositors
type, or in other words, the type vector selected randomly by nature.
Any impatient depositor i has a dominant strategy to withdraw, and
thus, si(si 1; i = 0) = 0 given any si 1: By eliminating uncertainty about
the type vector we can apply standard backward induction arguments to nd
the equilibrium in Proposition 1.6
Proposition 1. Given a bank run game. Suppose that the type vector is
perfect information. Then, the Pareto e¢ cient allocation is the unique PBE
outcome and depositors tell the truth.
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix B. Since the type
vector is of perfect information, the concepts of subgame perfect equilibrium
and PBE coincide. Intuitively, the last patient depositors optimal decision is
to wait if enough preceding patient depositors waited so that her consumption
in period 2 is higher than that received upon immediate withdrawal. Antic-
ipating this decision, the next to last patient depositors optimal decision is
to wait, and by moving backward all patient depositors wait.
Apart from the unique PBE outcome derived in Proposition 1, the set
of Nash Equilibria of this bank run game contains strategy proles in which
all patient depositors withdraw, and therefore, a bank run occurs. However,
these equilibria are not subgame perfect and are eliminated when requiring
the additional rigor of PBE or subgame perfectness imposed by sequential
rationality and backward induction, respectively.
6Note that if types are observable, then the bank could impose the rst best allocation
by force, denying to pay to patient depositors. However, we disregard this possibility and
show that the depositorsdecisions lead to the rst best allocation.
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3.2 The type vector is imperfect information
When the type vector is not observable, depositors cannot apply the previous
reasoning. Nevertheless and as before, they commonly know p and N; and
that nature selects each type vector with equal probability. Moreover, each
depositor knows her own type and observes the history. This is referred to
as available information. Given the available information, a depositor forms
beliefs about the type vector selected by nature and, by sequential rational-
ity, anticipates how subsequent depositors behave. In this environment of
imperfect information, sequential rationality plays a similar role as backward
induction in games of perfect information (see Myerson, 1997). Before prov-
ing the general result, the di¢ culties that arise are illustrated in an example.
3.2.1 Example
Suppose that there are four depositors: one is impatient and the other three
are patient. Before the game begins, nature selects each of the four possible
type vectors with equal probability. Once the type vector is selected, each
depositor observes her type but not any others. Then, they take decisions in
a sequential order. Also, all three patient depositors have to keep the money
in the bank in order to make waiting worthwhile for all of them.
We depict the corresponding extensive form of the game in Figure 1, where
p stands for patient, i for impatient, keep for wait, and wi for withdraw, and
where the outcome of each branch of the game is depicted, that is, bank run
and no bank run, respectively. There are several information sets that are
not singletons: for instance, a patient depositor in position 2 who observes a
withdrawal does not know whether she is in a type vector that starts with a
patient depositor who decided to withdraw or in the type vector that begins
with the impatient depositor. Finally, in order to simplify the gure, we
suppose that each impatient depositor withdraws since this is a dominant
strategy for her, as is shown below. We will go through all possible strategy
proles and show that no bank run is the unique PBE outcome.
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Figure 1: Extensive form game of the example
Belief updating and consistency of beliefs
Since each type vector is selected by nature with equal probability, a patient
depositor in position k 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g assigns the same probability to each
sequence in which the impatient depositor is at position j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g such
that j 6= k: That is, ks updated prior belief assigns a probability of 1
3
to any
of these sequences. Posterior belief updating takes into account the observed
decisions.
Consider rst a separating equilibrium, in which depositors strategies
reveal their type. Since an impatient depositor is never strictly better o¤ to
wait we focus on a separating equilibrium in which any patient depositor is
asked to wait and the impatient one to withdraw. For instance, consider a
14
patient depositor in position 2. Her updated prior assigns a belief of 1
3
to type
vectors (0; 1; 1; 1); (1; 1; 0; 1) and (1; 1; 1; 0); respectively. On the equilibrium
path, a depositors observation of the previous depositorsdecisions reveals
their types and she also knows her own type. Suppose now that she observes
that depositor 1 waits. Then, her updated posterior, 2; assigns probability
1
2
each to type vectors (1; 1; 1; 0) and (1; 1; 0; 1): However, if a withdrawal is
observed, then 2 assigns probability 1 to type vector (0; 1; 1; 1): Depositor
2 thus updates her belief in a Bayesian way and belief updating is consistent
with the available information and the proposed strategy prole.
On any o¤-equilibrium path, at least one patient depositor withdraws.
Consider now a patient depositor in position 3. Given her available infor-
mation, her updated prior assigns probability 1
3
to each sequence (1; 1; 1; 0);
(1; 0; 1; 1) and (0; 1; 1; 1): After observing two withdrawals, she knows that
she is o¤the equilibrium path. Since this history has an ex ante 0-probability,
her belief updating is unconstrained and her posterior belief 3 may assign
any probability that is consistent with her observation. As it turns out, on an
o¤-equilibrium path, it is enough for depositors to take into account the ob-
served history and their strategy is optimal given any consistent belief and
there are several since the history has an ex ante 0-probability.
In a pooling equilibrium, observations are not informative since both
types of depositors take the same decision. Since an impatient depositor is
never better o¤ to wait, we focus on the case in which some patient depositor
withdraws. Suppose that a patient depositor 1 should withdraw according to
her strategy, that is, independently of her type, depositor 1 is asked to with-
draw. On the equilibrium path, a patient depositor 2 observes a withdrawal
and her posterior belief 2 assigns equal probability to each type vector in
which depositor 2 is patient. Suppose that on an o¤-equilibrium path, a pa-
tient depositor 2 observes a waiting. This is o¤-equilibrium since depositor
1 is asked to withdraw independently of her type. In this case, depositor 2s
posterior belief updating is unconstrained since this history has an ex ante
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0-probability. Depositor 3 also realizes to be on an o¤-equilibrium path and
updates her belief again in a Bayesian way based on depositor 2s updated
posterior belief.
PBE requires that the belief system is consistent with the strategy prole.
Moreover, it has to be consistent with the available information, that is, a
depositors type, her observed history, the commonly known parameters p
and N; and that each type vector is selected by nature with equal probability.
Deriving the PBE
Consider the following PBE candidate: independently of the realized type
vector, on the equilibrium path, each patient depositor waits, while the sin-
gle impatient depositor withdraws. Each depositors prior belief is obtained
as stated above. On the equilibrium path, each depositor obtains her poste-
rior belief by updating her prior in a Bayesian way, taking into account the
available information. In particular, any depositor before her who waited is
believed to be patient, while a depositor who withdrew is believed to be im-
patient (as long as there was at most one withdrawal). Each order among the
remaining patient and impatient depositors that she believes are behind her
in the queue is equally likely. The depositorso¤-equilibrium path strategies
and beliefs are derived below for each depositor.
Since an impatient depositor has a dominant strategy to withdraw, her
strategy is optimal after any history and given any belief.7 She has no prof-
itable deviation from withdrawing and, given that she is impatient, her up-
dated prior belief assigns probability 1 to the true type vector selected by
nature since the other three depositors are patient.
Consider now the patient depositorscomplete strategy and belief system:
Depositor 4: On the equilibrium path, she identies the type vector since,
given the strategy prole, there are two patient depositors before her who
waited and an impatient one who withdrew. By Bayesian belief updating,
7Though on an o¤-equilibrium path on which the bank ran out of funds she is indi¤erent
to wait or not since her utility is 0 anyway, and thus, her strategy is not strictly dominant.
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4 assigns probability 1 to the true type vector selected by nature.
In case she waits, she receives u4(4c2); while she receives u4(c

1) if she
withdraws. Since she is patient, that is, 4 = 1; it holds that u4(4c2) >
u4(c

1); and she is strictly better o¤ to wait. Thus, her strategy is sequentially
rational given her belief and her belief is consistent with the strategy.
Suppose that she observes an o¤-equilibrium path history. Then, her
belief and her corresponding o¤-equilibrium path strategy are as follows:
After observing history (1, 0, 0) or (0, 1, 0), her belief updating is un-
constrained since both histories have an ex ante 0-probability. After history
(0, 0, 1) or (0, 0, 0), depositor 4 updates 4 according to Bayesrule, though
depositor 3 updated 3 after an unexpected history in an unconstrained way.
In any of the four cases, depositor 4 observed two or three withdrawals before
her. Since by assumption waiting is worthwhile if, and only if, all three pa-
tient depositors wait, she cannot deviate protably from withdrawing. If she
withdraws, then she receives a higher utility than if she waits, unless the bank
ran out of funds. Her decision is sequentially rational given any consistent
belief and any belief is consistent with the strategy since an o¤-equilibrium
path is reached and belief updating is unconstrained.
Suppose next that depositor 4 observes history (1, 1, 1), that is, all three
preceding depositors wait. Then, depositor 4 is the rst to nd herself on
an o¤-equilibrium path and her belief updating is unconstrained. However,
independently of her updated posterior belief, her expected utility is u4(4c2)
if she waits and u4(c1) if she withdraws. It holds again that u4(4c

2) >
u4(c

1); and she is strictly better o¤ to wait. Given any belief she may have,
her strategy is sequentially rational, and even more, it is optimal given the
observed history and her belief is consistent with the strategy.
Depositor 3: There are four possible histories a patient depositor 3 can ob-
serve. After observing histories (1, 1), (1, 0) and (0, 1), she believes to be
on the equilibrium path and Bayesian updating assigns a posterior belief of
probability 1 to type vectors (1, 1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1, 1) and (0, 1, 1, 1), respec-
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tively. While in the rst case, depositor 3 is the third depositor that waits,
in both others, she is the second one that waits. However, in the last two
cases, she believes with probability 1 that the last depositor is patient and
by sequential rationality anticipates that this depositor will wait.
If she waits, her expected utility is u3(3c2); since her updated posterior
belief assigns probability 1 to the true type vector, while it is u3(c1) if she
withdraws. Since she is patient, that is, 3 = 1; it holds that u3(3c2) >
u3(c

1); and she is strictly better o¤ to wait. Her strategy is sequentially
rational given her belief, and her belief is consistent given the strategy.
Note that if a patient depositor in position 1 or 2 withdraws, and the other
depositor waits, then the game reached an o¤-equilibrium path, though for
depositor 3 the observed history is consistent with being on the equilibrium
path and she behaves as if this were the case. Given her consistent belief,
she is strictly better o¤ to wait.
Finally, suppose that she observes history (0, 0), that is, the only possible
o¤-equilibrium path history a patient depositor 3 can identify. Since this
history has an ex ante 0-probability, belief updating is unconstrained. In any
case, if she withdraws, then she receives a higher utility than if she waits,
unless the bank ran out of funds. Her strategy is optimal given the observed
history and there are several consistent beliefs.
Depositor 2: She either observes that depositor 1 waits or withdraws. In
both cases, her observation is consistent with the equilibrium path (since
there is one impatient and two patient depositors apart from her), even if an
impatient depositor 1 waits or a patient one withdraws. After observing a
waiting, consistency of beliefs requires that her updated posterior belief 2
assigns probability 1
2
respectively to type vectors (1, 1, 0, 1) and (1, 1, 1, 0),
and after observing a withdrawal, that it assigns probability 1 to type vector
(0, 1, 1, 1). Both updated posterior beliefs are obtained by Bayesrule and
are consistent with the strategy prole in which all patient depositors wait.
If she observes a waiting and waits herself, by sequential rationality, she
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anticipates that the last patient depositor behind her waits (after observing
two waitings), and if she observes a withdrawal, then she believes that the
two remaining depositors after her in the queue are patient. By sequential
rationality she anticipates that both of them wait. In any case, her expected
utility by waiting is u2(2c2): If she withdraws instead, then her expected
utility is u2(c1): Since she is patient, that is, 2 = 1; it yields her a higher
utility to wait. Depositor 2s updated posterior belief 2 is consistent with
the strategy prole which is sequentially rational given her belief.
Depositor 1: She knows that she is patient and 1; the updated prior, assigns
an equal probability of 1
3
to type vectors (1; 1; 1; 0); (1; 1; 0; 1) and (1; 0; 1; 1);
respectively. By sequential rationality, she anticipates that, on the equilib-
rium path, the other two patient depositors wait, and her expected utility by
waiting is u1(1c2); while it is u1(c

1) if she withdraws. Since she is patient,
it yields her a higher utility to wait. Belief 1 is consistent with the strategy
prole which is sequentially rational given her belief.
Given this strategy, any depositors decision on the equilibrium path is
fully revealing for the subsequent depositors and no bank run is a PBE.
Are there other consistent belief systems?
On the equilibrium path, any other belief system is not consistent with the
strategy prole since it assigns a positive probability to a depositor who
withdraws to be patient or to a depositor who waits to be impatient or both.
Even more, it is not consistent with the available information. However, on
some o¤-equilibrium path, while the depositorsstrategies are optimal given
the observed history, a depositors posterior belief updating is unconstrained
and there are several possible consistent beliefs. Thus, the consistent belief
system is not unique. Yet, the strategy prole is a PBE and yields no bank
run as outcome.
Uniqueness of PBE outcome
We are only interested in showing that the unique PBE outcome is no bank
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run, though there are multiple PBE which di¤er by beliefs and strategies of
depositors o¤ the equilibrium path. Once the bank ran out of funds, any
depositor, whether patient or not, is indi¤erent to wait or withdraw, and
this gives rise to multiple o¤-equilibrium path strategies compatible with the
unique PBE outcome (on the equilibrium path). However, since no depositor
has a protable deviation, and thus, no o¤-equilibrium path is ever reached,
it holds that no bank run is the unique PBE outcome as long as there are no
other PBE in which there is a bank run.
In any other PBE candidate, either a patient depositor withdraws or an
impatient one waits on the equilibrium path or both. Since an impatient
depositors dominant strategy is to withdraw, we only consider all strategy
proles in which one or more patient depositors withdraw.
Suppose rst that all three patient depositors withdraw. We show next
that this is no PBE since some patient depositor has a protable deviation.
Later we do the same for the strategy proles in which one or two patient
depositors withdraw. In this way, we consider all possible strategy proles,
and after showing that a bank run is never a PBE outcome, it follows that
no bank run is the unique PBE outcome.
PBE candidate: all three patient depositors withdraw
The impatient depositors dominant strategy is to withdraw. Moreover, given
her knowledge of her own type and the common knowledge that the other
three depositors are patient, her updated prior and posterior belief assigns
probability 1 to the true type vector selected by nature.
Consider now the decision of any patient depositor. A patient depositor
4 observes three withdrawals on the equilibrium path. Given the available
information, she cannot update her prior belief about the type vector selected
by nature since the strategies of the preceding depositors do not reveal their
type. Since all three patient depositors have to keep the money in the bank
in order for waiting to be worthwhile, she is either indi¤erent to wait or
to withdraw if the bank ran out of funds, or she is strictly better o¤ to
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withdraw if the bank still has funds left. Thus, she withdraws. This behavior
is sequentially rational and her belief is consistent given her strategy.
In order to analyze her o¤-equilibrium behavior, we focus on a specic
history for which we will show that some depositor has a protable deviation.
Suppose that on an o¤-equilibrium path, a patient depositor 4 observes
that two depositors waited before her. Then, by waiting she receives a strictly
higher utility than by withdrawing and it is sequentially rational for her to
wait given the observed history. The depositor who observes the rst waiting
updates her belief in an unconstrained way since she nds herself on an o¤-
equilibrium path. However, it is consistent with the available information for
a patient depositor 4 to believe that both depositors that waited are patient.
Thus, 4 assigns probability 1 to the type vector in which the depositor that
withdrew is impatient. This belief is consistent with this o¤-equilibrium path
strategy which in turn is sequentially rational given her belief.
Consider now a patient depositor 3. On the equilibrium path, she observes
two withdrawals and cannot update her belief from the prior. She is strictly
better o¤ to withdraw than to wait as long as the bank has still funds left.
Suppose that on an o¤-equilibrium path she observes that two depositors
waited before her. Then, by waiting she receives a strictly higher utility
than by withdrawing and it is sequentially rational for her to wait given the
observed history. Similarly as before, one consistent updated belief 3 is
that both depositors that chose to wait are patient. In this case, 3 assigns
probability 1 to the type vector in which the last depositor is impatient. This
belief is consistent with the available information and the strategy which in
turn is sequentially rational given her belief.
If depositor 3 observed one waiting and one withdrawal, then she under-
stands that the depositor before her that waited brought the game onto an
o¤-equilibrium path. If the rst depositor withdrew and the second waited,
then she is not sure whether depositor 1 is patient and complied with the
equilibrium strategy or is impatient. However, if depositor 1 waits, then it
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is consistent with the available information for depositor 3 to believe that
depositor 1 is patient and that depositor 2 who withdrew is impatient since a
patient depositor 2 after observing a waiting would have waited as well.8
Then, depositor 3 receives a strictly higher utility by waiting than by with-
drawing given depositor 4s o¤-equilibrium path strategy, that is, she believes
that depositor 4 is patient and will wait as well. This belief is consistent with
the strategy which is sequentially rational given her belief.
Consider now a patient depositor 2. On the equilibrium path, she observes
one withdrawal and cannot update her belief from the updated prior. Thus,
she is strictly better o¤ to withdraw than to wait.
Suppose that on an o¤-equilibrium path she observes that depositor 1
waits. Then, she understands that depositor 1 brought the game onto an
o¤-equilibrium path. Since this history has an ex ante 0-probability her
belief updating is unconstrained. However, it is consistent with the available
information for a patient depositor 2 to believe that it is equally likely for the
impatient depositor to be in the third or fourth position, respectively, and
for the third patient depositor to be in the other. By sequential rationality,
she anticipates that, if she waits, then the last patient depositor will wait as
well. This yields her a higher expected utility and she waits. Her belief is
consistent with the strategy which in turn is sequentially rational given her
belief.
Consider now a patient depositor 1. On the equilibrium path, she should
withdraw. However, she can increase her expected utility by deviating, that
is, by waiting. By sequential rationality she anticipates that then the second
patient depositor waits independently of whether she is in position 2 or 3.
Given this, the third patient depositor (in position 3 or 4) waits as well.
Hence, there is no bank run. Depositor 1 cannot update her prior apart form
taking into account that she is patient. This belief is consistent given the
8A patient depositor 2 would wait since upon observing two waitings the remaining
patient depositor either in position 3 or 4 would wait by sequential rationality.
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strategy prole and is obtained by Bayesian updating.
Given this strategy prole and a type vector in which the rst depositor
is patient, there is no bank run since depositor 1 has a protable deviation
to lead the game onto an o¤-equilibrium path on which based on the previ-
ous arguments all patient depositors wait. Therefore, for all depositors to
withdraw is no PBE.
The behavior of patient depositors on an o¤-equilibrium path is sequen-
tially rational given the observed history. Even if they formed other beliefs
than stated and whenever the history has an ex ante 0-probability, belief
updating is unconstrained , then for all depositors to withdraw is no PBE
since a patient depositor 1 has a protable deviation to wait.
Finally, note that patient depositors in positions 2 to 4 have protable
deviations if they were asked to withdraw on some o¤-equilibrium path on
which they observe a certain number of waitings before them. More con-
cretely, depositor 3 and 4 wait if they observe two waitings and depositor
2 waits after a waiting. Similarly, depositor 3 waits even after observing a
waiting followed by a withdrawal since using sequential rationality she can
infer that depositor 2 was impatient, and hence, by waiting she can induce
the last patient depositor to wait as well.
Similarly, a strategy prole in which one or two patient depositors are
asked to withdraw is no PBE. To see this, consider rst that two patient
depositors are asked to wait and one to withdraw. This is no PBE since
there is a type vector in which depositors 1 and 2 are patient and wait, and
the third patient depositor in the queue who is asked to withdraw has a
protable deviation to wait after observing two waitings before her.
Suppose next that two patient depositors are asked to withdraw and
one to wait. Then, analogously as above, it is possible to construct o¤-
equilibrium paths such that the rst patient depositor in the queue who is
asked to withdraw has a protable deviation to wait, and any other patient
depositor behind her will follow suit. If depositor 1 waits, then by sequential
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rationality a patient depositor 2 waits as well (even if she were asked to
withdraw) since after observing two waitings she anticipates that the last
patient depositor will wait as well. Then, the third patient depositor in the
queue also waits.
Hence, in this example, no bank run is the unique PBE outcome since
given any other strategy prole some depositor has a protable deviation.
3.3 The general case
The arguments in the previous subsection are generalized in order to nd the
set of PBE for any bank run game and the unique PBE outcome is that no
bank run occurs which is the Pareto e¢ cient allocation.
Proposition 2. Given a bank run game. Suppose that the type vector is
imperfect information. Then, the Pareto e¢ cient allocation is the unique
PBE outcome.
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix C. Intuitively, in any
PBE, given the available information, it is consistent for a patient depositor
to believe to be on the equilibrium path as long as there are N   p or less
withdrawals, that is, unless she observes a history which is incompatible
with being on the equilibrium path. She waits and anticipates, by sequential
rationality, that all other patient depositors behind her will wait as well.
Since to wait yields each of them a strictly larger consumption, for each of
them, it is optimal to wait. This in turn generates a history which induces
all other patient depositors to wait, while all impatient ones withdraw.
No bank run is the unique PBE outcome. However, there are several
PBE which all are identical on the equilibrium path, though they di¤er on
o¤-equilibrium paths. To see this, consider any history in which the bank ran
out of funds since there were too many withdrawals. Then, any depositor is
indi¤erent to wait or to withdraw since her utility is zero in any case, and she
has no protable deviation. Therefore, it is possible to construct multiple
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PBE that di¤er, for example, by the depositorsoptimal behavior after the
bank went bankrupt. However, on the equilibrium path, such a history never
occurs: patient depositors always wait and impatient ones always withdraw,
and the unique PBE outcome is no bank run. In Proposition 2s proof it is
shown that any other strategy prole that can arise is no PBE. Analogously
to the example provided above, given any other strategy prole, there is a
type vector for which some patient depositor has a protable deviation and
by leading the game down an o¤-equilibrium path, all patient depositors are
better o¤ to wait. By doing this, each of them receives a higher payo¤.
Finally, note that other Bayesian Nash Equilibria exist. However, all of
them are based on incredible threats, and thus, are no PBE. For example,
for all depositors to withdraw is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the game
which results in a bank run. However, in a PBE, each patient depositor upon
being called to decide is better o¤ to wait than to withdraw, unless she would
receive a lower period-2 consumption. Since all patient depositorsreasoning
is identical and, by sequential rationality, each of them anticipates that all
subsequent patient depositors will wait as well, in a PBE, each of them is
better o¤ to wait. The rigor of PBE makes no bank run the unique outcome.
There is some experimental evidence supporting our nding. Kiss et al.
(2012) nd that in small-scale experimental banks with unknown type vector
the occurrence of bank runs is signicantly lower in sequential setups (as in
our model) than in simultaneous setups (resembling the Diamond-Dybvig
framework).
4 Conclusion
Descriptions of bank runs suggest that depositorsbehavior depends crucially
on other depositorsobserved behavior. Existing theoretical models in the
Diamond-Dybvig tradition, without aggregate uncertainty about liquidity
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needs, do not incorporate this idea, sequentiality is missing from them.9
We attempt to ll this gap and assume that depositors observe all previous
strategies. We show that bank runs do not occur in equilibrium, even though
the type of preceding depositors is not observed. This result contrasts starkly
with the ndings of previous models, and suggests that the insensitivity
of the Diamond-Dybvig contract to aggregate liquidity needs does not lead
necessarily to bank runs as an equilibrium outcome. If all previous decisions
are observed, in our model, bank runs are no equilibrium outcome.
Two elements of the model contribute to the absence of bank runs. First,
aggregate certainty serves as a kind of coordination device to signal all patient
depositors that it is in their best interest to wait, that is, it is commonly
known that a bank run never occurs if all of them wait. Moreover, this
assumption is quite realistic most of times. Second, the sequentiality of
moves together with the perfect observability of previous decisions ensure
that this is the unique PBE outcome. This equilibrium concept imposes
strong rationality requirements on the depositors in terms of beliefs and
sequential rationality.
Our model helps to understand depositor behavior in the polar case when
information is highly detailed. Arguably, in reality depositors do not have
the amount of information assumed in our model. Thus, it remains to be
studied exactly how much information is needed to prevent bank runs due
to coordination failure. For example, suppose that only withdrawals can be
observed. Then, obviously, in the example with four depositors the reason-
ing which makes no bank run the unique PBE outcome breaks down, since
deviations from the run strategy cannot be observed, so a patient depositor
by waiting cannot induce subsequent depositors to wait. This suggests that
observing waitings is necessary to prevent bank runs, though it is an open
question to what extent. Advancing our understanding in these issues en-
9However, there are models that follow the spirit of Green and Lin (2003) and allow
depositors to observe previous strategies to a certain extent, such as Ennis and Keister
(2011).
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ables policymakers to implement better rules and create environments that
reduce the occurence of bank runs.
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Appendix A
Appendix A contains the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. In order to derive the threshold value ; a condition is found such
that c1 is strictly smaller than period-2 consumption, that is,
c1 <
R(N   (N   )c1)

; (1)
where the right-hand-side is period-2 consumption if  depositors wait at
t = 1: Solving this inequality for  yields
 >
RN(c1   1)
c1(R  1)
: (2)
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Denote by [x] the integer part of any x 2 R: Since  is a natural number,
the previous condition becomes
 >

RN(c1   1)
c1(R  1)

 : (3)
The right-hand side of (3) denes the threshold value : This value is unique
since the bank pays to every depositor who withdraws c1; and therefore,
loses funds monotonically. If there are too many withdrawals by patient
depositors, then the bank only pays c2;i < c1 to every depositor i which waits
until t = 2: If the number of patient depositors that wait  is not larger than
; as derived in (3), then period-2 consumption is strictly below c1:
Appendix B
Appendix B contains the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. We show that under perfect information, in the unique PBE which in
this case is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium each depositor announces
her type truthfully.
First, conditions are derived under which period-1 consumption is strictly
larger than period-2 consumption and a patient depositor is better o¤to with-
draw at t = 1; that is, she declares to be impatient, and does not announce
her type truthfully. Thereafter, it is shown that this never occurs in equilib-
rium, the depositorsequilibrium strategies are derived and shown to be a
PBE, and nally, uniqueness is established.
As shown in Lemma 1, if  or less patient depositors wait, then c2;i < c1
and a patient depositor is better o¤ to withdraw as long as the bank pays her
c1: However, if there are further withdrawals, then at some point the bank
cannot pay c1 any more, but rather has 0 < y < c

1 of funds left which she
would pay to the last depositor that declares to be impatient. Then, there
are two possibilities. Either period-2 consumption is larger than or equal to
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y; or it is strictly smaller. In the rst case, any patient depositor is better
o¤ to wait if, and only if, there is no more impatient depositor left in the
queue (since she would withdraw y): If there is some impatient depositor left
who would withdraw y; then the patient depositor is better o¤ to take y at
t = 1; rather than to get 0 at t = 2; and she withdraws all remaining funds.
In this case, the depositor whose turn it is, once the bank has left y of funds,
declares to be impatient independently of her type.
Now the complete strategy for all depositors is derived: an impatient
depositor always withdraws and a patient depositor withdraws if, and only
if, her period-1 consumption is strictly larger than her expected period-2
consumption. Otherwise, she waits. This is a subgame perfect equilibrium
and a PBE of the bank run game if no depositors deviation from this strategy
prole is protable. Consider rst any impatient depositor is deviation and
suppose that she waits at t = 1: Then, she receives the same or a lower utility
since for her i = 0; and thus ui = 0; and this deviation is not protable.
Consider now any patient depositors unilateral deviation. If she withdraws
instead of waiting, then her consumption is c1 < c

2; and this deviation is
not protable for her given that all other patient depositors wait under the
proposed strategy prole. Similarly, suppose that too many depositors before
her withdrew already and that her strategy prescribes her to withdraw at
t = 1: Then, she cannot deviate protably either: she would receive 0 by
waiting and at least the same amount by withdrawing.
This subgame perfect equilibrium is found by backward induction. Since
any impatient depositor has a dominant strategy to withdraw at t = 1; the
argument focuses on patient depositors. The last patient depositor waits
if enough patient depositors waited since then her consumption is c2;i >
c1 or c2;i > y: The next to last patient depositor waits if enough patient
depositors waited anticipating (by backward induction) that then also the
last patient depositor is strictly better o¤ to wait. By induction, this is true
for all previous patient depositors. Finally, by induction, also the rst patient
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depositor waits, that is, all of them wait and each receives c2 > c

1: Applying
backward induction, each depositors decision is unique on the equilibrium
path since none of them is ever indi¤erent. However, on any o¤-equilibrium
path on which the bank ran out of funds, any depositor is indi¤erent to wait
or withdraw since her utility is 0 independently of her strategy. Hence, there
is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and PBE outcome, while there are
several subgame perfect equilibria and PBE which di¤er by the depositors
behavior on irrelevant o¤-equilibrium paths.
Appendix C
Appendix C contains the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. We prove Proposition 2 in various steps. First, we give a complete
description of all possible types or classes of equilibrium strategy prole can-
didates and their corresponding belief system. Then, we show for each class
whether the corresponding strategy proles are PBE or not, and nally, it
follows as a corollary that the unique equilibrium outcome is no bank run
since the only class of strategy proles that are PBE is the one that yields
no bank run as outcome. For all other classes it is shown that the strategy
proles belonging to them are no PBE.
Since any depositor can only wait or withdraw, there are the following
classes of equilibrium strategy prole candidates: on the equilibrium path,
all depositors wait or withdraw (these candidates correspond to pooling equi-
libria since all depositors are prescribed the same strategy), all patient de-
positors wait and all impatient ones withdraw or vice versa (these candidates
correspond to separating equilibria since all depositors of one type are pre-
scribed a di¤erent strategy than those of the other), and nally, any other
mixture of strategies among patient and impatient depositors.
Next it is shown that any strategy prole in which impatient depositors
are prescribed to wait on the equilibrium path is no PBE. Consider rst a
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pooling equilibrium in which all depositors are asked to wait. Then, there is a
type vector in which some depositor has a protable deviation. Suppose that
depositor 1 is impatient. Then, she gets a utility of 0 if she waits and c1 if
she withdraws. Thus, she withdraws. In general, waiting yields an impatient
depositor always a utility of 0, and withdrawing at least 0, and strictly more
if the bank still has funds left. Therefore, withdrawing is a weakly dominant
strategy for an impatient depositor, and thus, for all depositors to wait is
no PBE. By an identical argument, it follows immediately that a separating
equilibrium candidate in which on the equilibrium path impatient depositors
wait and any mixture candidate in which some impatient depositor is asked
to wait on the equilibrium path are no PBE either.
Thus, a separating equilibrium candidate is left in which patient depos-
itors wait and impatient ones withdraw on the equilibrium path, a pooling
equilibrium candidate in which all depositors withdraw on the equilibrium
path, and any mixture equilibrium candidate in which, on the equilibrium
path, all impatient depositors and at least one but less than p patient depos-
itors should withdraw, while the remaining patient ones are asked to wait.
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Belief updating
For the three remaining classes of strategy proles, belief updating is illus-
trated in detail. Each type vector is selected by nature with equal probability.
Since there are N depositors of which p are patient and this is commonly
known, there are
 
N
p

possible type vectors. Each is selected with probability
1
(Np)
:
After knowing her type, a depositor updates her belief assigning equal
probability to all type vectors in which the depositor in her position has her
type. In particular, a patient depositor in the n-th position believes that each
type vector in which a patient depositor occupies the n-th position is selected
with probability 1
(N 1p 1)
: Similarly, an impatient depositor in the n-th position
believes that each type vector in which an impatient depositor occupies the
n-th position is selected with probability 1
(N 1p )
: We sometimes refer to this
as updated prior belief. Further belief updating depends on the proposed
strategy prole, the observed history, the commonly known parameters p
and N; that each order is equally likely to be selected by nature and on a
depositors realized type. We refer to this as available information. Beliefs
are updated in a Bayesian way (whenever possible) taking into account the
available information and requiring consistency of beliefs.
Finally, since impatient depositors are always weakly better of to with-
draw, consistency of belief updating for the three remaining equilibrium strat-
egy prole candidates requires that a depositor who observes that some other
before her waits believes that this depositor is patient. All remaining patient
and impatient depositors are equally likely to occupy the remaining spots in
the queue (unless the observed history has 0-probability to occur and belief
updating is unconstrained).
Deriving the PBE
After eliminating any equilibrium candidate in which some impatient deposi-
tor waits on the equilibrium path, three classes of equilibrium strategy prole
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candidates are left. First it is shown that a pooling equilibrium strategy pro-
le candidate in which all depositors withdraw on the equilibrium path and
any mixture candidate in which on the equilibrium path all impatient and at
least one but not all patient depositors withdraw are no PBE.
No PBE
Pooling equilibrium candidate: On the equilibrium path, any depositor is
asked to withdraw. In this case, a depositors strategy does not reveal her
type (at least on the equilibrium path), and thus, a depositor keeps her up-
dated prior as belief. On an o¤-equilibrium path, it is consistent for her to
believe that someone who waits is patient given that any impatient deposi-
tors weakly dominant strategy is to withdraw.
In order to show that this strategy prole is no PBE, we will focus on a
specic type vector selected by nature but unknown to the depositors and a
specic o¤-equilibrium path history for which some depositors deviation is
protable. Suppose that a patient depositor towards the end of the queue
observes a history with p   1 waitings. Then, she concludes that she is o¤-
equilibrium, that the p  1 depositors that waited before her are patient and
that she is the last patient depositor in the queue. Updating her belief in
a Bayesian way, she believes that all remaining depositors in the queue are
impatient. She is strictly better o¤ to wait since she is patient and by waiting
receives c2; while she get c

1 if she withdraws. Hence, she waits. If her strategy
prescribes her to withdraw, then she has a protable deviation to wait, and
she complies with her strategy if she is asked to wait after this history. Note
that the same is true for any history starting with p 1 waitings and followed
by at most N   p withdrawals.
Consider next a patient depositor who observes p 2 waitings and knows
to be on an o¤-equilibrium path. Updating her belief in a Bayesian way, she
assigns an equal probability to each type vector in which one more patient
depositor occupies each of the remaining positions behind her in the queue.
By sequential rationality she anticipates that this depositor will wait upon
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observing p  1 waitings. In any case, as long as there were enough waitings
such that c2;i > c1;i; then she is strictly better o¤ to wait given the observed
history. Analogously any patient depositor i before her who observed enough
waitings such that c2;i > c1;i; is strictly better o¤ to wait. Updating her
belief in a Bayesian way, depositor i believes that before her those depositors
that waited are patient and all others impatient. Thus, any distribution
among the remaining depositors is equally likely. In any case, there were
enough waitings such that waiting is strictly better for i: Hence, on this o¤-
equilibrium path, she either has a protable deviation from withdrawing or
is prescribed to wait and this yields her a higher payo¤.
Consider any history starting with p   2 waitings. Given that a patient
depositor observing p   1 waitings will wait, a patient depositor after p   2
waitings waits. Thus, if a withdrawal is observed after p   2 waitings, then
it is due to an impatient depositor. As a consequence, a patient depositor
observing a history that begins with p 2 waitings and is followed by a with-
drawal is strictly better o¤ to wait. By the same reasoning, when observing
any history that starts with p  2 waitings and is followed by at most N   p
withdrawals, a patient depositor waits.
Going backwards in the queue, consider now the patient depositor i who
observes just enough waitings such that c2;i < c1;i if she withdraws, but
c2;i > c1;i if she waits since then there were enough waitings for waiting to
be a dominant strategy for any remaining patient depositor in the queue.
After observing this history, it is a strictly dominant strategy for her to wait.
One consistent belief of her is that all depositors before her who waited are
patient and that the remaining patient ones are equally likely to occupy the
remaining spots in the queue. As before, she has a protable deviation if she
is asked to withdraw.
Consider now a patient depositor towards the beginning of the queue.
Suppose that she observes that the rst depositor in the queue waits. Then,
she knows that this depositor brought the game onto an o¤-equilibrium path
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by deviating since the rst depositor (as all others) are asked to withdraw
on the equilibrium path. In case she observed further waitings, then she
concludes that all depositors that waited are patient (since an impatient
one would never wait). Her belief assigns equal probability to all remaining
patient depositors, less the ones that waited before her and herself, to occupy
the remaining positions behind her in the queue. By sequential rationality,
she anticipates that all of them will wait upon observing this history. Then,
weighting her payo¤ by her belief she is strictly better o¤ to wait rather than
to withdraw. She deviates protably if she is asked to withdraw.
Going backwards, this argument applies analogously to all patient depos-
itors in the queue but the rst one. The rst depositor knows that she is
patient and that by waiting she leads the game onto an o¤-equilibrium path
on which it is then sequentially rational for all remaining patient depositors
in the queue to wait as well. Provided that nature selects a type vector in
which the rst depositor in the queue is patient, then this depositor has a
protable deviation and no bank run is the outcome.
Thus, we have shown that there are type vectors such that a pooling
strategy prole is no PBE since a patient depositor 1 who is prescribed to
withdraw has a protable deviation. In case some patient depositors are
asked to withdraw on certain o¤-equilibrium paths, then it is possible to nd
other protable deviations. Therefore, this strategy prole is no PBE.
Any remaining mixture equilibrium candidate: In this case, at least one and
at most p 1 patient depositors and all impatient ones are asked to withdraw.
Then, there are two possibilities. Suppose rst that only few patient de-
positors are asked to withdraw such that c2;i > c1 for any patient depositor i
who waits, and provided that all of them comply with the prescribed strategy
prole. Then, obviously, any patient depositor i who is asked to withdraw
has a protable deviation to wait as well since c2;i > c1: Hence, we focus on
a strategy prole in which enough patient depositors are asked to withdraw
such that c2;i < c1 for any patient depositor i who waits indeed. Similarly as
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before, the type of a depositor who withdraws is not revealed, though it is
consistent for a depositor to believe that those who wait are patient.
As before, there are type vectors selected by nature such that a patient
depositor is rst in the queue and is asked to withdraw. She has a protable
deviation to wait, and by doing this, leads the game down an o¤-equilibrium
path whose outcome is no bank run. Then, by sequential rationality, all
patient depositors are better o¤ to wait. Therefore, any type of strategy
prole in this class yields no PBE either.
PBE
We are left to show that the separating equilibrium candidate predicting no
bank run is a PBE. In order to do this, rst the corresponding strategy
prole and belief updating are described in detail. Then, it is shown that
no players deviation is protable. This shows existence. However, there are
other o¤-equilibrium paths than the one proposed such that no depositor
has a protable deviation either. Hence, it follows immediately that there is
no unique PBE, though the unique PBE outcome is no bank run since, as
shown above, given any other strategy prole, some depositor has a protable
deviation.
On the equilibrium path, any patient depositor waits and any impatient
one withdraws. In fact, an impatient depositor is asked to withdraw after
any history, though she is indi¤erent to wait or not once the bank ran out of
funds. On the same o¤-equilibrium paths, this indi¤erence holds analogously
for patient depositors. Therefore, there are multiple PBE strategy prole
candidates that di¤er on o¤-equilibrium paths.
On the equilibrium path, every depositors strategy perfectly reveals her
type and it is consistent for a depositor to believe that those who wait are
patient and those who withdraw are impatient. Thus, she believes that the
remaining patient and impatient depositors (less the ones she observed before
her, including herself) are behind her in the queue. By Bayesian updating,
each distribution of remaining depositors is equally likely.
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On an o¤-equilibrium path, belief updating in a PBE depends on whether
the observed history has an ex ante 0-probability or not. As long as it is
consistent with being on the equilibrium path, a depositors belief is identical
to the one she would have if all depositors complied with the prescribed
strategy prole since there is no information that indicated her to be on an
o¤-equilibrium path. If some patient depositor before her withdrew, then
she only observes this depositors strategy and not her type. Therefore,
a depositor believes to be on the equilibrium path if, and only if, the total
number of withdrawals taking into account her own type is not larger than
the total number of impatient depositors and, in this case, belief updating
and consistency of beliefs are identical as above.
Consider now any other o¤-equilibrium path strategy prole and belief
system. The rst depositor who knows to be on an o¤-equilibrium path has
to be an impatient one who observes N   p withdrawals. While a patient
depositor who observes N  p withdrawals believes that all remaining depos-
itors in the queue are patient, an impatient one who observes this history
knows to be on an o¤-equilibrium path. Given her type, this history has
an ex ante 0-probability and her belief updating is unconstrained. In this
case, there are several possible ways to update beliefs consistently with the
available information and we propose one of them.
Suppose that she believes that all withdrawals she observes are due to pa-
tient depositors, unless there are more withdrawals than patient depositors.
In this case, suppose that she believes that the remaining withdrawals were
made by impatient depositors. Hence, she anticipates that all depositors be-
hind her are impatient. Finally, it could be that there were less withdrawals
than patient depositors: then she believes that all withdrawals are due to pa-
tient depositors, and that all impatient and the remaining patient depositors
except of herself are behind her in the queue.
Consider the rst patient depositor i in the queue who is asked to take
a decision after this transition to the o¤-equilibrium path. She updates her
38
belief in a Bayesian way. In the rst two cases, the number of withdrawals
that depositor i believes are due to patient depositors is such that c2;i < c1;i;
even if i keeps the money in the bank, while in the last case it could be
that c2;i > c1;i; if i and all remaining patient depositors that i believes to be
behind her in the queue wait. Then, i is prescribed to withdraw, unless she
is in the last case, in which she is asked to wait.
In the last case, there could be another patient depositor j 6= i; at a later
position in the queue who observed enough additional withdrawals such that
c2;j < c1;j; provided that j believes that all withdrawals were due to patient
depositors. Then, there is a transition from the o¤-equilibrium path on which
c2;i > c1;i to the one on which c2;j < c1;j;10 and j is prescribed to withdraw.
Belief updating in this transition from one o¤-equilibrium path to the
other is unconstrained since the observed history has an ex ante 0-probability,
and a patient depositor believes that enough if not all other patient depositors
were before her in the queue and withdrew, and thus, she anticipates that
all remaining depositors behind her in the queue will withdraw as well.11
Finally, there is a third (but less important) type of o¤-equilibrium path:
in case there are enough withdrawals for the bank to run out of funds, then
any depositor is indi¤erent to wait or not (independently of her type and
belief) since her utility is 0 anyway. In this case, there are several beliefs
that are consistent with the strategy prole of the remaining depositors, and
any strategy is sequentially rational given any of these beliefs (since both
waiting and withdrawing yields any depositor a utility of 0). Belief updating
is not restricted in the transition from the history in which the bank is not
10Lemma 1 fully describes all situations and conditions in which c2;j < c1;j since on any
o¤-equilibrium path, given the proposed belief system, it cannot happen that the condition
derived in the proof of Proposition 1 applies: that is, it cannot happen that there is y of
funds left and that on an o¤-equilibrium path, given the proposed belief system, a patient
depositor believes that there are only patient depositors left behind her in the queue.
11Nevertheless, on any o¤-equilibrium path, once a depositor has done the belief tran-
sition after a 0-probability event, all others update their belief in a Bayesian way as long
as the observed history has a positive conditional probability to occur.
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yet bankrupt to the one in which it ran out of funds.
No protable deviation
We show next that no depositor has a protable deviation from this strategy
prole. Obviously, no impatient depositor can deviate protably.
Consider next any patient depositor and the di¤erent possible histories:
on the equilibrium path, no patient depositor i can deviate protably since
she is strictly better o¤ to wait. Her belief to be on the equilibrium path is
consistent with the strategy prole and the available information. Given her
belief, it is sequentially rational for i to wait (since c2 > c

1) and her expected
utility weighted by her belief is ui(ic2) > ui(c

1) since i = 1:
Consider now the di¤erent o¤-equilibrium paths. Suppose that for a pa-
tient depositor i who nds herself on an o¤-equilibrium path it holds that
c2;i > c1;i; even if i believes that all withdrawals were due to patient deposi-
tors. Then, given her belief, it is sequentially rational for i to wait and this
is consistent with her belief i believes that there are enough patient depos-
itors behind her in the queue for c2;i > c1;i to hold, provided that all of them
wait. Her deviation to withdraw is not protable.
On any other o¤-equilibrium path, a patient depositor i believes that
enough withdrawals were due to patient depositors such that c2;i < c1;i:
Hence, it is sequentially rational for i to withdraw and her belief is consistent
with her strategy. Her deviation to wait is not protable. All subsequent
depositors observe a series of withdrawals, but not the depositorstypes, and
thus, eachs belief is consistent with her strategy and the observed history.
Finally, and as mentioned above, on an o¤-equilibrium path on which the
bank went bankrupt already, no depositor has a protable deviation and any
remaining depositors utility is 0 independently of her strategy and belief.
Therefore, we found a strategy prole such that no depositors deviation
is ever protable. This shows existence and concludes the proof that no bank
run is a PBE outcome. Note again that there are other o¤-equilibrium path
belief systems and strategies. Any such strategy prole and belief system that
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is sequentially rational and consistent, respectively, is also a PBE. Hence,
there is no unique PBE strategy prole.
A unique PBE outcome
After completely describing all possible strategy proles that can be con-
structed given the set of depositors, their types and available strategy choices
(wait and withdraw), we proved that any other type of candidate is no PBE,
except for the separating equilibrium candidate in which patient depositors
wait and impatient ones withdraw, and therefore, no bank run occurs. Since
this is the only outcome arising from a PBE, it follows that the unique equi-
librium outcome is no bank run.
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